اطلاعات بيشتر
۱۰ شهریور ۱۳۹۲، ۰۹:۱۰ ب.ظ
سلام دوستان خوبم
اگه فرصت کردین اینو ترجمه کنید، نیازش دارم
قسمتی از یک مقاله حسابرسی است، برای پیشینه نیازش دارم
ممنون
Within the agency theory framework, DeAngelo (1981a) provides an economic modelling approach for analysing the auditor-client relationship and is widely cited, particularly in the research field of auditor independence (Geiger and Raghunandan 2002). She argued that the existence of client-specific quasi-rents to incumbent auditors would lead to a practice of setting audit fees below total costs or ‘low balling’ in the initial period of an audit engagement, thus lessening independence. The rationale for audit firms to practice ‘low balling’ is their ability to recover the loss incurred during the initial period by manipulating the client-specific quasi-rents that would accrue to them from continually auditing the same client. The client-specific quasi-rents arise from the existence of technological advantages on future audits of a given client and from the expensive transactions costs involved in changing auditors. Incumbent auditors can capture these rents by setting future audit fees above the total costs of producing the audits. However, if they realise that they stand to lose the quasi-rents, their independence may be compromised 17 as they attempt to retain the quasi-rents and to avoid termination of their contract by the client. Thus, DeAngelo concluded that low balling itself is not a threat to independence since the initial fee reductions are considered as sunk costs in the future and the rules prohibiting low balling will have little effect on the protection of independence.
اگه فرصت کردین اینو ترجمه کنید، نیازش دارم
قسمتی از یک مقاله حسابرسی است، برای پیشینه نیازش دارم
ممنون
Within the agency theory framework, DeAngelo (1981a) provides an economic modelling approach for analysing the auditor-client relationship and is widely cited, particularly in the research field of auditor independence (Geiger and Raghunandan 2002). She argued that the existence of client-specific quasi-rents to incumbent auditors would lead to a practice of setting audit fees below total costs or ‘low balling’ in the initial period of an audit engagement, thus lessening independence. The rationale for audit firms to practice ‘low balling’ is their ability to recover the loss incurred during the initial period by manipulating the client-specific quasi-rents that would accrue to them from continually auditing the same client. The client-specific quasi-rents arise from the existence of technological advantages on future audits of a given client and from the expensive transactions costs involved in changing auditors. Incumbent auditors can capture these rents by setting future audit fees above the total costs of producing the audits. However, if they realise that they stand to lose the quasi-rents, their independence may be compromised 17 as they attempt to retain the quasi-rents and to avoid termination of their contract by the client. Thus, DeAngelo concluded that low balling itself is not a threat to independence since the initial fee reductions are considered as sunk costs in the future and the rules prohibiting low balling will have little effect on the protection of independence.
